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ABSTRACT 
Heterogeneous Responses of Firms to Trade Protection 
This paper uses EU firm-level panel data to estimate the effect of Antidumping 
(AD) protection on the productivity of EU domestic firms in import-competing 
industries. We find that firms with relatively low initial productivity - laggard 
firms - have productivity gains during AD protection, while firms with high initial 
productivity - frontier firms - experience productivity losses. While the 
productivity of the average firm is moderately improved during AD protection, 
productivity remains below that of firms never involved in AD cases, thus 
questioning the desirability of protection. Our empirical results are consistent 
with recent theoretical work supporting the view that trade policy can have a 
differential effect on firms depending on their initial productivity. 
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Heterogeneous Response of Firms to Trade Protection2 
I. Introduction  
There is a growing consensus that in many cases Antidumping (AD) policy is an 
industrial policy tool in disguise. Rather than being targeted at keeping ‘unfair imports’ out, it 
is often aimed at fostering the interests of inefficient domestic producers, irrespective of the 
intent of importers (Shin, 1998). In view of the industrial policy nature of AD measures, it is 
surprising that so little empirical work exists on measuring the effects of AD policy on 
domestic producers. A natural question that comes to mind is whether AD protection makes 
domestic firms more inefficient or whether domestic firms use the protection period as an 
adjustment period during which they engage in restructuring to become more productive by the 
time AD protection comes off.  The recent availability of micro level data sets implies that this 
question can now be analyzed.  
In general the demand and supply of trade protection tends to be stronger in industries 
facing strong import-competition resulting from a change in comparative advantages (Hillman, 
1982). In the absence of trade protection, neo-classical trade theory would predict that firms in 
those industries are likely to exit and resources to shift to sectors with higher returns. Trade 
protection fully or partially prevents this reshuffling of resources and is likely to result in sub-
optimal levels of exit. This is bad for domestic consumers since trade protection prevents 
domestic prices to fall to lower world market levels. Traditional trade theory would also 
predict that all incumbent industry-specific interests unequivocally benefit from trade 
                                                
2 We thank the CEPR meeting 2007 in Tarragona, a CEPR-Productivity workshop 2006 at UCD Dublin, the EIIE 
conference in Slovenia 2005, a CEnter-Tilburg 2005 and CORE-Louvain seminar, the Midwest 2004 Spring meetings 
in Indianapolis, a World Bank seminar in 2004, the ETSG conference in Madrid, the LSE-IFS seminar on Productivity,  
and the Antidumping conference in Nottingham 2004. We thank Jan De Loecker, Rachel Griffith, Jim Harrigan, Beata 
Javorcik, Richard Rogerson, Ray Riezman, Stephen Redding, Mary Amiti, Maurice Schiff, Johannes Van Biesebroeck 
and Joe Clougherty.  In particular we would also like to thank two anonymous referees for constructive comments. A 
special thanks goes to the editor Dan Trefler for additional guidance. 
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protection. However, recent trade literature (i.e. Melitz, 2003) has pointed out the importance 
of heterogeneity between firms implying that several traditional trade results need to be more 
qualified. Indeed when allowing for firm heterogeneity in initial productivity this paper finds 
that trade protection is not in the interest of all domestic firmsWe find that highly productive 
firms-frontier firms- are negatively affected by AD protection with productivity falling during 
protection. Lowly productive firms are positively affected by AD protection with productivity 
rising during protection. The falling productivity of frontier firms is an additional cost of 
protection emerging from the heterogeneous firms’ literature that adds to the loss in domestic 
consumer surplus and the sub-optimal levels of exit. 3  
To better understand the theoretical link between trade policy and firm-level productivity, 
we turn to several strands of theoretical models that deal with this. Lileeva and Trefler (2007) 
is particularly useful as a background model to interpret the empirical results we obtain. They 
show that when trade policy results in an increase in market size, firm-level productivity 
responses are heterogeneous. In addition to a fixed cost of exporting (Melitz, 2003; Helpman, 
2006), the model assumes a fixed cost of productivity improving investment. While 
productivity gains raise profits on all units sold, only firms with a low initial productivity and 
high potential productivity gains invest when market size increases. Using tariff cuts by the US 
against Canadian imports resulting from the US-Canada Free trade Agreement, Lileeva and 
Trefler (2007) find that the labor productivity of small and lowly productive Canadian plants 
increase more than the productivity of large and highly productive firms. While their paper 
deals with trade liberalization its results can easily be transposed to the context of AD trade 
protection described in the present paper. AD trade protection can increase the market size of 
existing domestic firms to the detriment of foreign importers. This implies that some domestic 
                                                
3
 Gallaway et al. (1999) have estimated the welfare cost of US AD and Countervailing Duty law at $4 billion a year. 
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firms that would have exited in the absence of trade protection can now engage in restructuring 
to improve their productivity by investing for example in new machinery or by hiring better 
skilled workers to cope with import competition once protection comes off. The most 
productive domestic firms that already operate at competitive cost levels and minimum 
efficient scale and in no danger of exiting in the face of foreign competition are much less 
affected by the increase in market size and have a lower incentive to improve their productivity 
during protection. Another but related explanation for the AD heterogeneity we observe 
between highly and lowly productive firms is provided by the recent literature linking exports 
to productivity. More in particular Melitz (2003) showed that only the most productive firms 
engage in exporting. Despite the fact that we do not have data on exports at the firm level, from 
the high correlation between productivity and exporting we can conjecture that the highly 
productive firms in our sample are also the exporting firms. These firms realize a substantial 
part of their sales outside their own market and therefore benefit relatively less from an 
increase of the domestic market size than purely domestic firms that do not export. High 
productivity exporters may even experience reduced market access abroad if domestic trade 
protection results in retaliatory action whereby trade partners in turn protect themselves 
(Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2006; Prusa, 2001). Reduced market access abroad for exporters 
offers a possible explanation for the loss in productivity that we observe for highly productive 
firms during protection. Also, according to the “learning-by-exporting” literature, reduced 
market access abroad would lower learning resulting from exporting and negatively impact 
firm-level productivity (De Loecker, 2007; Van Biesebroeck, 2005)  
An additional interpretation for the AD heterogeneity could be related to the high 
correlation that exists between exports and imports at the firm level. Exporting firms tend to 
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source a relatively higher share of their intermediates from abroad. Trade protection is likely to 
raise the price of imported intermediates which undermines the productivity of domestic 
exporting firms (Amiti and Konings, 2007). While we can not formally test this due to a lack 
of data on exports and imports at the firm level, these interpretations are all consistent with our 
finding that only lowly efficient domestic firms benefit from AD protection while highly 
productive domestic firms loose.  
Another line of literature that is related to our findings is the relationship between 
firms’ adoption of new technology and trade policy (Miyagiwa and Ohno, 1995; 
Ederington and McCalman, 2008). These papers have explored how trade policy can induce 
domestic firms to restructure and accelerate the speed of adoption of more efficient 
production technologies.4  Finally, our results can also be usefully compared to recent work 
by Aghion et al. (2005) who showed that a reduction in product market competition reduces 
the technology gap in an industry. Also, Boone (2000) shows that when firms operate under 
weak product market competition, the incentive to innovate in such markets is stronger for 
less efficient firms. The intuition underlying this result is that with weak competition, 
strategic effects between firms are smaller than under tough competition. 
Our data set includes all newly initiated European AD cases in three consecutive years 
1996, 1997 and 1998. We turn to European data for two reasons. AD protection in Europe is of 
a more temporary nature than in the US5 and in Europe, in contrast to the US, non-listed firms 
also disclose firm level information on an annual basis.  
                                                
4
 We use the term restructuring to refer to firms engaging in cost reducing investment, broadly defined and interpreted. 
5
 Europe has always had a Sunset Clause limiting the protection period to 5 years. The US adopted the Sunset clause 
much later after the Uruguay Round. 
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We identify firms in the European Union (EU)6 in sectors directly affected by the AD 
policy and use their corresponding firm-level company accounts data to obtain output and 
input measures for the period 1993 to 2003 to estimate Total Factor Productivity (TFP) before 
and after AD protection. We estimate TFP using the approach proposed by Olley and Pakes 
(1996), which controls for sample selection of firms and the endogeneity of input factors.  
Using a difference-in-difference (DD) approach with firm-level fixed effects we 
evaluate the effect of AD protection using two different control groups. A first control group 
consists of all firms that filed for AD protection but did not receive it since the outcome of the 
case was ‘termination’ without protection. But since the firms in this control group belong to 
industries that filed for protection, there could be selection at work in terms of which industries 
receive positive rulings versus negative rulings. To control for endogeneity of AD protection 
and potential selection effects, we also turn to a ‘matched’ control group of firms inspired by 
the matched sampling techniques developed by Heckman et al. (1997). For this, we estimate 
the probability of AD protection using a multi-nominal logit model similar to the one in 
Blonigen and Park (2004) to “match” the protected firms to firms in similar sectors but that 
never filed an AD case nor received protection. The use of a ‘matched’ control group in the 
difference-in-difference analysis is generally regarded as an acceptable way to deal with the 
potential endogeneity of trade policy such as AD protection7. 
Firms that file for protection on average have a lower productivity compared to firms in 
the control group outside AD. This corresponds to Regev and Griliches (1995) reporting that 
firms under threat of exiting tend to have low levels of productivity. We find that AD 
                                                
6
 During the period of our analysis the European Union consisted of 15 countries. 
7
 De Loecker (2007) used a similar approach to analyze the effects of learning by exporting on 
productivity. 
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protection raises the short-run productivity of the average protected firm by about 3% with 
long-run effects on productivity levels ranging between 6% and 8%.   
We engage in a number of empirical experiments to show that the effect of AD we 
identify on measured productivity are not or at least not entirely attributed to price movements. 
Our data like most firm-level data does not have information on output prices at the firm level. 
Instead we use unit values of goods traded on the internal EU market and protected by AD as 
an alternative deflator in the TFP calculations.  
A logical question following our analysis is where do the average productivity 
improvements come from.  Although data limitations do not allow us to measure exit rates of 
firms very precisely8, it is unlikely that average productivity improvements during AD 
protection are driven by exit rates.  First, the Olley-Pakes approach for estimating TFP takes 
into account biases that emerge from estimating TFP in the presence of firm exit. Although we 
have an imprecise measure of firm exit, we do take this into account when estimating TFP. 
Second, a growing number of papers show that free trade promotes efficient exit as shown by 
Trefler (2004) in the context of the Canada-US free trade agreement and Amiti and Konings 
(2007) in the context of trade liberalization in Indonesia. Therefore it is safe to conjecture that 
trade protection is likely to result in sub-optimal levels of exit. Our exit measure, despite its 
poor quality seems to confirm this. For the ‘matched control group’ the average exit rate over 
the sample is 3% while for the protected firms we find it to be much lower and around 1.8%.   
Recent trade models like Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) have shown how trade affects the 
average productivity in an industry by enabling more productive firms to take a higher market 
                                                
8 The firm-level data that we use entails inclusion criteria with minimum levels in terms of 
employment, turnover and sales. This makes it difficult to distinguish a true exit from a firm that falls 
forever below the inclusion criteria. Furthermore, the way firm level data are stored on Amadeus 
implies that especially for the earlier years of the data not all firms that exit are kept on the data 
records. The same applies for the measurement of entry. 
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share and less productive firms to shrink. This paper, however, is not concerned with these 
general equilibrium reallocation effects between firms, but instead focuses on how trade 
protection affects the evolution of within firm level productivity. In our empirical analysis we 
find evidence of labor shedding, increased R&D spending and an increase in investment in 
fixed assets at the firm level during AD protection. But there can be additional channels 
through which productivity can be improved that we can not measure. Bernard et al. (2006) 
argue that plants in import-competing sectors facing tough competition from abroad are likely 
to change their output mix towards products with more capital and more skilled labor content. 
While “product switching” is a very likely source of productivity improvement our data does 
not hold information on that. Also, our data does not have information on skilled versus 
unskilled labor preventing us to analyze skill upgrading in production. We do find that average 
wages at the firm level go up after protection which could be consistent with an increase in the 
skill mix. However increased wages may also be consistent with rent-sharing where some of 
the profits resulting from protection are shared with workers in the form of a higher wage. 
Whatever the correct interpretation, in both cases productivity is likely to go up. An increase in 
the skill mix is likely to boost productivity, just as a wage increase for existing workers is 
likely to induce more effort since workers stand to loose more when fired.  
The results of this paper should by no means be interpreted in favor of a wider use of 
AD protection. Our firm-level analysis clearly reveals that firms that file for protection on 
average have a much lower initial productivity than unprotected firms outside AD. Even after 
the protection period, average productivity of protected firms is still below that of firms in the 
matched control group belonging to other sectors of the economy. This suggests that although 
lowly productive protected firms realize productivity gains during protection, these are not 
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sufficient to close the productivity gap with firms outside AD. An alternative scenario where in 
the absence of AD protection the lowly productive firms would have exited the market and 
resources would shift to other more productive sectors in the economy where productivity 
levels are higher, would therefore seem a better idea. Under such an alternative scenario the 
productivity gains realized by firms are likely to go beyond the ones that we measure in this 
paper. Therefore a process of dynamic creation and destruction still seems the best guarantee 
from an economy wide perspective to realize most productivity gains.  
In the next section we discuss our data and in section III we present the empirical 
methodology and results. Section IV concludes.   
II. The Data 
II.1. Firm-level data 
An important innovation of our work is that we use firm-level data to test for the 
relationship between AD-protection and productivity of the protected firms. An AD-case 
typically involves an investigation of the evolution of imports and import prices from countries 
that are accused of dumping by the import-competing EU industry. The dumping complaint is 
investigated by the EU Commission and can result in ‘Protection’ or in ‘Termination’.9 If 
protection is decided upon, a final AD duty is imposed on the ‘dumped’ imports to protect all 
the firms in the EU import-competing industry. Protection can also be implemented in the form 
of price-undertakings. This involves a voluntary price increase offered by the alleged dumpers 
to offset the injury to the EU import-competing industry (EU regulation 386/94). Case reports 
reveal very little information on the details of price-undertakings agreed upon between the EU 
Commission and individual exporters. While in some AD cases, all exporters from a particular 
                                                
9In the U.S. many cases end in “withdrawals” by the complaining industry as shown by Prusa (1992). This is hardly 
ever the case in the EU where a “Termination” usually refers to a negative ruling by the EU Commission.   
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country are subject to a price-undertaking, in other cases a mixture of duties and price-
undertakings applies. When the Commission decides to ‘terminate’ the AD case, the dumping 
complaint is rejected and the EU industry does not get further import relief.  
For the purpose of analyzing the relationship between AD-protection and productivity 
of EU producers, we identify 4,799 EU firms that operate in the same sector as the dumped 
products. We obtain their company accounts from a commercial database sold under the name 
of AMADEUS10 that runs from 1993-2003. This is a pan-European set of company accounts 
with harmonized entries for all European enterprises on an annual basis.  
In Table 1 we give an overview of all the new AD cases11 that were initiated in 1996, 
1997 and 1998 and for which we could retrieve all the variables from the company accounts 
required for our analysis. In total, 29 new AD investigations were initiated when we count by 
product group which corresponds to 81 cases when we count cases by defending country. For 
each case we list the year of initiation, the corresponding 4 digit industry NACE revision 1, the 
average number of 8-digit HS codes involved, the year of decision, the average duty and the 
importing countries involved. We collect firm-level data for the EU import-competing sector 
based on the 4-digit NACE sector the product under investigation was classified in. The NACE 
classification is a detailed industry classification used by the European Union with 622 
different 4-digit codes. One notable advantage of this approach is that for the DD estimations, 
a control group can be found by “matching” protected sectors with other NACE 4-digit sectors 
that were never subject to AD filings.   
                                                
10 AMADEUS is a commercial dataset that can usefully be compared to COMPUSTAT data in the US, but in addition 
to listed firms, AMADEUS also includes unlisted firms. The AMADEUS data set has increasingly been used in other 
academic work. Recent examples include Budd, Konings and Slaughter (2005), Konings & Vandenbussche (2005) and 
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). 
11
 ‘New’ implies that these cases were not subject to protection when the case was initiated. 
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In 17 of the new cases (by product group), the outcome was protection, usually in the 
form of an AD duty but in some protection cases, price-undertakings were also offered and 
accepted by the EU Commission. Duties range between 13% and 82%, with an average duty of 
27%. In 12 other cases (by product group), the EU Commission did not grant import relief, 
after which the case was terminated.  
A number of remarks are in order here. In dealing with the cases we came across a 
number of overlaps. For example, in 1996 the case involving “Synthetic Fibre Ropes” was 
initiated against India but was terminated without protection later that year. The next year, in 
1997, a new petition by the EU producers of “Synthetic Fibre Ropes” was initiated against 
India and this time round the EU Commission decided to grant protection from 1998 onwards. 
This implies that the EU firms in the import-competing sector were protected from 1998 
onwards. For this particular case, we let the period before protection run from 1993-1997 and 
the period after protection from 1998 onwards. Another type of overlap arose when two 
different cases map in the same NACE 4-digit. A good example is “Cotton Fabrics”, a case 
initiated in 1996 and again in 1997, both resulting in a termination, which maps into the same 
NACE sector as “Woven Glass Fibre”, initiated at the end of 1997, also ending in a 
termination12. After dealing with the overlaps described above, we still have 23 different AD 
cases of which 16 ended in Protection and 7 were terminated. In view of the large number of 
AD-cases included in the analysis, it is not our intention to engage in an in depth industry-by-
industry analysis. While more in depth industry studies are clearly an interesting line of future 
research, our purpose here is to present evidence on productivity estimates of a large set of 
cases.  
                                                
12
 One other type of overlap occurred i.e. a case that first got terminated but in a later year ended in protection. For that 
case, we considered the sector as protected from the moment the product belonging to that sector received protection. 
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For clarification, we point out that when the EU Commission decides to impose a duty, 
it applies to all EU-member states producing the protected product and can be compared to a 
‘common tariff’ protecting the EU import-competing sector against imports from the dumping 
countries. AD protection remains in place for five consecutive years, after which AD-measures 
in principle come off. However, industries have the option to initiate an “expiry review” case. 
Such an “expiry” case can be initiated 3 months before the ending of protection, provided there 
are indications that when the protection comes off, injury and dumping would continue. The 
law stipulates that a decision regarding the continuation of the protection has to be reached 
within a year after the initiation of an expiry review. During the investigation the protection 
stays in place.13 If the expiry review is affirmative, the industry obtains 5 more years of 
protection. For the cases included in our analysis, in only 4 of them, an expiry review was 
initiated which is documented in Table 1. For example, “Seamless steel tubes”, a case 
originally initiated in 1996, whose protection period normally ended in 2002, applied for an 
expiry review which was decided affirmatively in 2004. Another affirmative expiry review 
case is the 1997 case “Synthetic Fibre Ropes”. In two other cases, notably the 1996 case “Bed 
linen” and the 1998 case “Steel Stranded Ropes and Cables”, an expiry review was initiated 
but the Commission ruled negatively and the protection was ended.  
We conduct our analysis both with and without expiry review cases. Including them in 
our analysis moderates the average productivity increase of protected firms that we find. This 
suggests that firms for whom protection is extended beyond a five year period engage less in 
restructuring than other firms. Extension of AD protection appears to temper restructuring and 
therefore appears even more distortive than the case where protection ends after 5 years.   
                                                
13
 The latest EU AD law is Regulation 384/96. 
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III. Empirical Methodology and Results 
III.1. Estimating Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
We estimate Total Factor Productivity (TFP) using our firm-level data for firms 
operating in each 4-digit NACE industry affected by AD initiations. Let us describe firm i’s 
technology at time t by a Cobb-Douglas production function:   
ititkitlit kly ηβββ +++= 0       (1) 
where yit, denotes the log of value added at the firm level, deflated by 4 digit sector-specific 
producer price indices, lit denotes the log of labor and kit, denotes the log of real capital 
measured by fixed tangible assets deflated by a capital price deflator14 and ηit is the residual. 
We use the Olley-Pakes methodology to estimate equation (1). The estimation procedure takes 
account of the simultaneity between input choices and productivity shocks, as well as sample 
selection bias. This allows us to estimate the coefficients in the production function (1), ßl and 
ßk, consistently for each product group. Using these estimates we define the log of TFP of firm 
i at time t denoted by tfpit, as the residual of the production function15, or   
itkitlitit klytfp
^^ ββ −−=       (2) 
The revenue based TFP estimates from equation (2) are likely to reflect differences in 
prices. Deflating firm level nominal value added with an industry wide price deflator would be 
fine if all firms were producing a single and homogeneous product and all face the same price 
for their products. However, with differentiated and multiple products this is unlikely to be the 
                                                
14
 The capital price deflator is country specific and obtained from the Annual macro economic (Ameco) 
database of the department of Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission. We thank 
Werner Roeger for providing the data. 
15
 Summary statistics of the variables used in (1) and estimated coefficients with OLS and Olley-Pakes 
can be found in the working paper Konings and Vandenbussche (2004). 
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case (Klette and Griliches, 1996; Levinsohn and Melitz, 2002 and Katayama, Lu and Tybout, 
2003). In addition, measured productivity can change as a result of changes in the product mix 
over time (Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2006)16. We therefore report a number of robustness 
checks. We report separate estimates for single versus multiple product firms and we report 
results where we use instead of a 4-digit industry producer deflator, a deflator constructed from 
the unit values of the products that were involved in an AD initiation. We also analyze the 
evolution of the unit values of the products involved in an AD initiation to assess whether a 
potential price effect might dominate the measurement of TFP. Our results clearly show that 
the productivity improvements are not a mere price effect. In fact, a recent paper by Mairesse 
and Jaumandreu (2005) on a panel of firms for which they have individual firm output prices 
find that whether value added is deflated with an industry output-price index, with an 
individual firm-output price index or not at all makes little difference for the estimation of the 
coefficients in the production function. This suggests that the customary practice of simply 
deflating output measures (sales, value added etc.) by industry output-price indices when 
estimating production functions is an acceptable approach.  
III.2 Evaluating the Effects of Antidumping-Protection 
III.2.1. Difference-in-Difference (DD) Equations  
A Difference-in-Difference (DD) approach consists of comparing TFP of the ‘treated’ 
group, i.e. the firms that got AD protection, to a control group of firms. A first natural 
candidate control group for the protection cases is clearly the termination cases. Termination 
                                                
16 Other potential biases emerge from the way in which input factors are measured, e.g. the labor input is 
measured in terms of number of employees rather than hours worked. Van Biesebroek (2007) compares different 
methods for estimating production functions on data characterized by known measurement errors and finds that 
the semi-parametric methods, like the O-P one we use here, is least sensitive to measurement error when 
estimating productivity.  
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cases involve firms in sectors that filed for AD protection but did not get it. We also turn to a 
second control group inspired by the matched sampling techniques developed by Heckman et 
al. (1997). To identify a matched control group we first estimate a multi-nominal logit model at 
the 4-digit NACE level. The variables included in our multi-nominal logit model are similar to 
the model of Blonigen and Park (2004). The data that we use includes information on filings 
and outcomes of all the AD cases at the 4-digit NACE level between 1995 and 2002. Our 
dependent variable can take three outcomes, ‘no filing’, ’filing that resulted in a termination’ 
and ’filing that resulted in protection’. As explanatory variables we include ’lagged import 
penetration’ defined as yearly imports from outside the EU into the 4-digit NACE sector over 
the sum of domestic production in the EU in the NACE 4 digit and imports from outside the 
EU.17 We also include ’lagged industry employment’, ‘EU GDP growth’ and the ‘number of 
previous AD filings’ in the NACE sector up to year t-1, where we count the number of 
previous AD filings from 1985 onwards. To control for pre-policy trends in productivity we 
also include the ‘lagged labor productivity’ in the sector as an additional variable. The 
inclusion of this variable is to account for the fact that the DD estimator assumptions may be 
violated if pre-treatment characteristics that are thought to be associated with the dynamics of 
the outcome variable are unbalanced between the treated and the untreated group (Abadie, 
2005). The results of the multi-nominal logit model are shown in the Appendix. Firms in 
industries with high import penetration, previous AD filings and lower average labor 
productivity seem more conducive to filing. The probability of protection seems mainly 
determined by a sector’s past experience in AD filings.  
                                                
17
 Trade data come from EUROSTAT and production data from PRODCOM. 
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The “matched” control group consists of sectors with a similar probability of protection 
but that never had protection.18. This resulted in a control group of 4,678 firms.19  We now test 










321 ___   (3)  
iα is a firm-level fixed effect that captures all unobservable characteristics between firms that 
do not vary over time. The YEAR dummies capture for both the firms in the control group as 
well as the firms that received AD-protection any time effect on TFP, common to all firms, due 
to e.g. business cycle effects, demand shocks or other common macro shocks. The COUNTRY 
dummies control for location specific effects for firms in particular countries inside the EU. 
We also interact these location specific fixed effects with the year effects to capture differences 
in shocks across various EU countries. Finally the term AD_EFFECT is a dummy equal to 1 
for the years following protection and zero in the years before but only for the group of firms 
in sectors j that got protection. For all other firms in the control group the dummy is zero. This 
AD_EFFECT captures the essence of the DD approach since its coefficient estimates the 
differential effect that AD-policy has on protected firms versus firms in the various control 
groups.    
                                                
18 Based on this we find that 69% of all NACE 4-digit sectors never faced AD protection. The matched 
control group consists of sectors that never received AD protection but with a predicted probability that was at 
least equal to the 75th percentile of the predicted probability of protection in the group of sectors that did 
receive AD protection. In addition we impose that average values of the explanatory variables - used in the 
multi-nominal logit model - of the matched group are statistically similar to the treatment group, the so called 
balancing property. 
19
 In the working paper version we report the NACE sectors in the “matched” control group with the OLS 
and O-P estimates of the labor and capital coefficient in the production function per sector. 
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III.2.2. Results 
We start by discussing some summary statistics shown in Table 2. Firms that file for 
protection on average are less productive than firms outside AD. This can be seen by 
comparing TFP across groups of firms in the period before filing as shown in column 1. A firm 
that files for protection but fails to get it is on average only 65% as efficient as the average firm 
in the matched control group of firms that never filed.  A firm that files and gets protection 
later on is only about 60% as efficient as the average firm in the matched control group in the 
period before filing. In the five year period after filing, the average protected firm becomes 
slightly more productive. It seems to catch up with those firms that filed for protection, but 
never received it. However, a productivity gap remains with those firms that never filed for 
protection. In particular, the protected firms reach an efficiency of 67% of that of an average 
firm in the matched control group, while a terminated firm in that same period is only 62% as 
efficient as the average firm never involved in AD filings.  This suggests that while protection 
allows the average protected firm to catch up in productivity to the level of the average 
termination firm, it is not sufficient to raise productivity to the level of the control group of 
firms outside AD. 
Next we proceed with the difference-in-difference (DD) estimations. In Table 3 we 
report the results of various specifications where we first use the termination cases (columns 1 
to 4) and then the matched counterfactual (column 5, 6) as respective control groups. In all 
specifications the main coefficient of interest on AD_EFFECT is positive and statistically 
significant irrespective of the control group we use. This suggests that firms in termination 
cases are a good counterfactual and that the potential selection effects at work are not too 
serious.  The magnitude of the positive effect differs depending on the control group we use 
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and whether we control for an autoregressive process of the first order AR(1) to allow for 
hidden dynamics20. In the specifications where we include an AR (1) process, the coefficient 
on the AD_EFFECT can be interpreted as a short-run estimate as in columns 3, 4 and 6 with 
coefficients ranging between 2 and 4% and with the estimated autoregressive coefficient 
reported at the bottom. Including the four expiry review cases where protection is prolonged 
for at least one additional year21 in the analysis as we do in column (5) lowers the productivity 
effects of AD, confirming our prior that firms that file for an expiry review case have less of an 
incentive to engage in restructuring during the initial protection period. A lower level of 
restructuring may make it easier to convince the investigating authorities that “injurious” 
dumping from abroad is still going on which would justify the request for further protection. 
Therefore an extension of protection is clearly not desirable. Earlier we already argued that 
protection is a very poor instrument to boost average firm-level productivity since it prevents 
resources to be freed up and to move to more productive sectors in the economy. Extensions 
clearly seem to further reduces the efficiency of the protectionist instrument. While we feel that 
the issue of expiry reviews deserves further attention, we do not regard it as the main focus of 
the current paper.  The small number of cases and firms involved and the relatively short time 
span of our data also prevent us to analyze what happens to firm-level productivity in the 
extension period.  
In order to check whether the positive effect of AD on measured productivity is driven 
by a price effect we carry out a number of experiments. First, in column 2 of Table 3 we use 
                                                
20  Allowing the error term to have an AR(1) is equivalent to including a lagged dependent variable. 
The problem with using a lagged dependent variable when simultaneously including firm-level fixed 
effects introduces a bias. Therefore we prefer to apply an AR(1) transformation, after which we 
perform a fixed effects estimation. We follow the procedure described by Baltagi and Wu (1999) and 
programmed in STATA. 
21 Protection continues during the expiry review investigation which usually involves one year.  
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the unit values of the products involved in the AD case as a deflator instead of a 4-digit 
industry deflator. These unit values stem from intra-EU trade flows of the 8-digit HS products 
involved in AD initiations. We retrieve the unit values over the same period as our firm level 
data and construct an price index for deflation purposes. Similar to Trefler (2004) we interpret 
changes in unit values within HS8 products as changes in prices. Using unit values as a 
deflator as we do in column (2) still yields a positive and significant coefficient on the AD-
EFFECT, suggesting that the productivity effects that we measure are not solely driven by 
price effects. However, deflating by unit values yields an AD coefficient of 4.5% which is 
somewhat lower than the 6.7% when using a PPI industry deflator as we do in column 1 of 
Table 2. Note that for the matched control group we can not use unit values as a deflator since 
different products than the AD ones are involved in the matched sectors which is why we can 
only use the 4 digit PPI deflators. Second, we analyze the evolution of unit values to check 
whether prices increased after AD-protection. To this end, we estimate a difference-in-
difference equation, but instead of analyzing the effects on firm level TFP we analyze the 
effects on the log of product level prices, proxied by the unit values of intra-EU imports. In 
particular we estimate the following equation and use the 8 digit HS unit values of goods in 
termination cases as our control.  
ktkkt TIMEEFFECTADprice εββα +++= 21 _ln               (4) 
The dependent variable is the log of the unit values of intra-EU imports of good k, kα refers to 
the inclusion of product-level fixed effects, while TIME is a common time trend and AD-
PRICE-EFFECT is a dummy equal to 1 for the years following protection and zero in the years 
before but only for the group of products k that got protection. The coefficient on the AD-
PRICE-effect is the coefficient of interest and indicates whether price movements of protected 
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goods evolved differently than for those goods in terminated AD cases that never received 
protection. We assume an AR(1) process in the error term, which is equivalent to including a 
lagged dependent variable. The results in Table 4 show that there is little evidence of strong 
price increases after protection. In column (1) we fail to find a significant increase in the 
average prices as a result of AD.  Interacting the AD-PRICE-EFFECT with time dummies in 
column (2) shows that price effects in most years are insignificant, with the exception of the 
fourth and the fifth year after AD protection where there is a positive effect on prices be it only 
at the 10%. By and large these results suggest that effects on domestic EU prices are moderate. 
One possible explanation is the “Public interest” clause that prevails in the EU. In principle this 
clause prevents the EU from imposing AD protection if consumer interests - in the form of 
rising prices - would be hurt by it.22  
Our findings are not in contrast to Prusa (1997) who shows that AD protection raises 
the unit values of foreign imported goods which results in domestic consumers paying more for 
foreign varieties than before the protection. A reasonable interpretation of this  asymmetric 
response of foreign versus domestic prices seems to be that AD protection forces the foreign 
price to align on the price of domestic products to close the price gap between foreign and 
domestic prices. Interestingly, also Liebman (2006) for the US fails to find a significant 
increase in U.S. steel prices after a safeguard was put in place by the US government. Liebman 
(2006) using disaggregated product-level monthly panel data for steel finds that U.S. prices 
were much more affected by business cycle conditions and industry rationalization than by the 
safeguard protection imposed on imports of steel from abroad. The relative stability of EU 
domestic prices after AD protection suggests that the increase in EU firm-level markups after 
                                                
22 In a recent AD case the EU Trade Commissioner Mandelson argued that antidumping duties on 
shoes against China and Vietnam were justified since the price of European shoes would at most go up 
by 1.5 Euros a pair (http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/respectrules/anti_dumping/pr230206_en.htm). 
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AD protection as reported earlier by Konings and Vandenbussche (2005) seems at least in part 
driven by increases in the average efficiency of protected firms, rather than by increases in 
prices.  
III.2.3. Distance-to the-Frontier heterogeneity 
As discussed in the introduction, theoretically there are reasons to suspect that the 
effects of protection on productivity may differ across firms. In particular, we expect the effect 
of protection on productivity to be stronger for less efficient domestic firms. To get at this idea, 
we introduce firm heterogeneity within the group of protected firms, in terms of their initial 
“distance to the frontier firm”. We define the initial “distance-to-the-frontier” for each firm i as 
the ratio of TFP over the productivity in the frontier firm j in the initial year of our sample. 








ijt =         (5) 
A distance of 1 implies that a particular firm is as efficient as the frontier firm, while a distance 
of 0 refers to a “laggard” with the lowest possible efficiency level compared to the frontier 
firm.  In Table 5 we show the results of our DD specification, but now including the initial 
‘DISTANCE’ variable and the interaction of that variable with our previous treatment variable 
AD_EFFECT X DISTANCE. All specifications control for serial correlation and include fixed 
effects. For the moment we focus on column 1 and column 5 where we use the firms in 
termination cases and the matched firms as a respective control groups. The AD-EFFECT in 
both specifications is positive and significant. As expected the interaction of the AD-EFFECT 
with DISTANCE is negative and statistically significant. This confirms the notion that the 
further away a firm is from the EU frontier firm in its corresponding sector, the stronger the 
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impact of protection. Or in other words, the positive effect of AD protection on productivity is 
smaller for firms closer to the efficiency frontier. The mean and median initial distance of the 
EU firms in protected sectors is 34 % and 30% respectively with a standard deviation of 20%. 
Or put differently, the median firm is only about one third as efficient as the most efficient firm 
in its industry in terms of initial productivity. This suggests that the distribution of productivity 
in an industry is skewed to the left with relatively few very efficient firms that have 
productivity levels far higher than the median firm. This can be seen from Figure 1 where we 
plot the kernel density of initial distance of protected firms. The majority of lowly productive 
firms lie to the left. Incidentally, the lowly productive firms are small firms in terms of 
employment. When we weigh initial distance with employment it can be noted from Figure 1 
that the kernel density function lies to the right of the unweighted one.  
Using the results in column 1 of Table 5, we see that while the coefficient on the 
AD_EFFECT is positive and equal to 0.053, the interaction effect is negative -0.06. The 
overall AD_EFFECT of protection on productivity therefore depends on firms’ initial relative 
productivity. For the mean distance firm in the sample, the AD_EFFECT is positive and 
around 3.2% (0.053-(0.06x0.34)).  The result we obtain for the protected firms when compared 
to the matched control group is still positive but smaller i.e. 1.7% (0.079-(0.181x0.34). .  
III.2.4. Single-Product firms versus Multi-Product firms 
One of the problems we face is that a number of domestic firms in our analysis operate 
in different sectors and produce multiple products. One way we controlled for this thus far is 
that we only included firms in the analysis whose “primary sector of activity” corresponds with 
the import-competing sector that the dumped products belong to. Or put differently, we 
included firms whose operations predominantly belong to the sector filing for AD protection. 
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However, what we have not controlled for up to this point is that a substantial number of firms 
are also active in other 4-digit NACE sector. We would expect AD protection to have more of 
an effect on the productivity of those firms whose primary and only line of activity falls in the 
same NACE sector as the AD activity. Therefore we classify firms on the basis of their number 
of NACE codes. A firm that is active in only one NACE sector is defined as a single product 
firm, whereas a firm active in two NACE sectors or more, is considered a multi-product firm. 
This is obviously a rough way of classifying single versus multiple product firms, but even 
with this rough proxy we would expect the results to be stronger on the single product firms.  
In Table 5 we report the results of a DD approach now distinguishing between single 
and multiple activity firms in the treatment and in the control groups.23 Independent of the 
control group, the AD_EFFECT is positive and significant in the case of single activity firms 
while for the multi-activity firms we fail to find any statistically significant effect, which 
confirms our expectation.  
Based on the results that we obtain for the single product firms it is now possible to 
visualize who wins and who looses productivity during protection as we do in Figure 2. We 
show the change in productivity of protected firms on the vertical axis as a function of their 
initial productivity (distance) on the horizontal axis, both when compared to terminated firms 
(specification in column 2 of Table 5) and to matched firms (specification in column 5). Figure 
2 nicely illustrates the heterogeneous response of firms to trade protection depending on their 
initial productivity. The downward sloping curves intersect with the horizontal axis when 
productivity gains of protection are zero and a firm is indifferent towards protection. Firms 
with an initial productivity to the left of the indifferent firm have a productivity gain during 
                                                
23 Note that the number of observations used in this analysis is smaller, because the data for French firms do not 
distinguish between single and multiple product firms so we excluded data of French firms. 
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protection, while firms to the right of the intersection loose productivity during protection. We 
clearly see that who wins and who looses from protection depends on which control group was 
used. Relative to firms in Terminated cases, all protected firms with an initial distance smaller 
than 0.72, gain in productivity and win from protection. Inspection of the frequency 
distribution of protected firms in terms of initial distance as documented earlier in Figure 1 
makes it clear that this involves the large majority of protected firms although the number of 
winners is clearly smaller under the employment weighted productivity distribution. Compared 
to a matched group of firms, fewer protected firms win namely only those with an initial 
distance below 0.4. This involves about two thirds of the firms under the unweighted kernel 
and about one half of the firms under the employment weighted kernel distribution. The 
smaller number of protected firms that win when compared to the matched control group 
seems to suggest that the productivity gains for the matched firms were stronger than for firms 
in termination cases. 
  III.2.5. Mis-specified Dynamics 
Recently Bertrand et al. (2004) argues that standard DD approaches may result in biased 
estimates of the treatment effect due to mis-specified dynamics. They show in simulations that 
including a simple auto-correction process like we do in Tables 3 and 5, does not necessarily 
perform well and may still bias the estimates as the dynamic process may still be mis-specified. 
One simple way to correct for that proposed by Bertrand et al (2004) is to collapse the time 
series into a “pre-“ and “post-“ period. Using this approach, we compute the average TFP pre-
AD protection and the average TFP post-AD protection. In doing so, we average out any 
temporary shock in TFP. The results of this approach are shown in the first two columns of 
Table 6, giving qualitatively similar long-run effects as we obtained earlier.  In addition, we 
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also turn to a long-run differences approach similar to the approach used by Trefler (2004) 
where we compare TFP growth in the pre- and post- AD period. We compute TFP growth as in 
Trefler (2004) by the annualized 5-year long run change in log TFP, where initial TFP is taken 
as the level of TFP prior to protection24. The results are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6. 
We find that TFP growth increases by 1.7% as a result of AD. Allowing for firm heterogeneity 
in column 4 by interacting the AD-Effect with distance and applying it to the average firm 
yields an effect of AD protection of TFP growth of 2%. We can interpret these results as the 
short run effect of AD protection on TFP, similar as the results reported in Table 3.  
Finally in column 5 of Table 6 as an additional robustness check we interact the AD-
Effect with year dummies to check whether the treatment effect takes some time before it 
affects TFP. For this we return to our original firm-level panel and interact the AD-Effect with 
year dummies. It can be noted that productivity increases occur every year of the five year AD 
protection period. To what extent the productivity continues to improve when protection comes 
off is an equally interesting question but one we can not address given the time span that we 
have.  
III.2.6. Digging Deeper: Where do Productivity Improvements come from? 
Finally the question can be raised where the productivity improvements come from. 
Given that we have estimated TFP after taking into account variation in input factors, the 
increase in TFP that we measure here is unlikely to be explained by a scale effect, but seems 
rather to be consistent with the idea that the average firm has stronger incentives to engage in 
cost reducing restructuring efforts once they receive temporary protection. Also, looking more 
                                                
24
 For computing the long difference prior to protection it was not possible to compute the 5-year long 
difference for the cases initiated in 1996 since our data only started in 1992, so we used the 4-year long 
difference instead, but recomputed on an annual basis by dividing through the number of years. 
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in depth at some of the other firm level variables in our data suggests that productivity 
improvements go beyond spare capacity utilization.  In Table 7 we report the results of a 
difference-in difference analysis with firm-level fixed effects where we compare gross 
investment, employment, R&D25 and wages between firms in AD protection cases and firms in 
terminations, which are arguably the most similar to the protected firms. We find that the 
average protected firm seem to reduce employment, increase gross investment in tangible fixed 
assets, increase R&D spending and pay higher wages after AD protection compared to non-
protected firms. All this suggests that protected firms are downsizing more in terms of 
employment and are investing relatively more in tangible and intangible fixed assets. This 
implies that the capital intensity of production is going up possibly resulting in higher value 
added or high quality products. Protected firms are paying more to their workers which could 
either be a reflection of rent-sharing or of an alteration of the skill mix at the firm level where 
unskilled workers are replaced by more skilled workers. Unfortunately, our firm level dataset 
only allows us to verify a limited number of channels through which productivity can be 
improved. Other effects are likely to be at play. For instance recent work by Bernard et al. 
(2006) points at evidence of product switching in industries that face tough import competition. 
They find that trade shocks often coincide with firms dropping uncompetitive products. While 
we can not verify this in our dataset, it is clear that such a change in the product mix is likely to 
result in higher productivity.  
IV. Conclusion  
                                                
25 Researchers have pointed out that antidumping protection often targets R&D-intensive industries (Niels, 
2000).   
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This paper empirically measures the effect of temporary Antidumping (AD) protection 
on firm-level productivity of domestic import-competing firms. For this purpose we identified 
around 4,800 European producers affected by AD cases. While we find the productivity of the 
average firm to be moderately improved during AD protection, productivity remains below 
that of firms never involved in AD cases, thus questioning the desirability of protection. The 
effect of protection on firm level productivity that we find is subject to firm heterogeneity. 
Firms with relatively low initial productivity – laggard firms – have productivity gains during 
AD protection, but firms with high initial productivity – frontier firms – experience 
productivity losses during protection. The falling productivity of frontier firms is an additional 
cost of protection emerging from this paper that adds to the loss in domestic consumer surplus 
and the sub-optimal levels of exit.  These empirical results are consistent with recent 
theoretical findings that have pointed at the relationship between market size (Lileeva and 
Trefler, 2007), product market competition (Aghion et al. 2005, Boone, 2000), temporary tariff 
protection and the adoption speed of new technology (Miyagiwa and Ohno, 1995; Ederington 
and McCalman, 2007). An interesting future line of research would be to engage in more in 
depth industry studies to explore the channels through which productivity changes at the firm-
level in response to trade policy are made. 
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rev.1 Decision (Duty/ 
Undertak/Termination)










 of  
Review Defendants 
1996  Cotton fabrics-unbleached  17 1720 T 1997 0   China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan,  
Turkey 
Synthetic fibre ropes  4 1752 T  1997 0   India  
Briefcases, schoolbags, 
luggage & travel goods(d) 
6 1920 T  1997 0   China  
Seamless pipes and tubes   5 2722 D/U(a)  1997 21 2002 D 
Russia, Czech. Republic, Romania,  
Slovak Republic, Poland, Hungary 
Bed linen (cotton type)   5 1740 D   1997 16 2002 T Egypt, India, Pakistan   
Stainless steel fasteners    7 2874 D    1998 32   China, India, Malaysia, Korea, Taiwan,  
Thailand   
Ferro-silicomanganese 1 2710 D 1998 58.3 ecu per  
ton   
China 
1997 Fax machines 1 3220 D 1998 43   China, Japan, S-Korea, Malaysia,  
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand 
Potassium permanganate 1 2413 D 1998 21   India, Ukraine 
Polysulphide polymers 1 2417 D 1998 13   USA 
Synthetic fibre ropes 4 1752 D 1998 82 2003 D India 
Monosodium glutamate 1 2441 T 1998 0   Brazil, USA, Vietnam 
Cotton fabrics 15 1720 T 1998 0   China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Turkey 
Strips of iron or non-alloy steel4 2732 T 1998 0   Russia 
Synthetic fibre ropes 4 1752 T 1998 0   S-Korea 
Unwrought magnesium 2 2745 D 1998 32   China 
Stainless steel bright bars 4 2731 D 1998 25   India 
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Thiourea dioxide 2 2414 T 1998 0   China 
Hardboard 10 2020 D/U 1999 16   Japan, Korea, Malaysia, China, Taiwan 
Bicycles 2 3542 D 1999 18   Brazil, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,  
Lithuania, Poland, Russia 
Electrolytic alumin.  
Capacitators 
3 3210 T 1999 0   Taiwan 
Woven glass fibre 1 1720 T 1998 0   USA, Thailand 
1998 Polypropylene binder 1 1752 D /U 1999 26   Japan 
Steel stranded rope & cables 1 2873 D/U 1999 45 2004  T Poland, Czech. Republic, Hungary 
Stainless steel wire 4 2734 D/U 1999 56   China, India, South Africa, Ukraine 
Steel stranded rope & cables 1 2873 D/U 1999 44   India, Korea 
Polyester  filament yarn 4 2470 T 1999 0   Hungary, Mexico, Poland 
Stainless steel heavy plates 1 2710 T 1999 0   Korea, India 
Seamless pipes and tubes 2 2722 D /U 2000 31   Slovenia, South Africa 
(a) This refers to a “mixed case” in which the EU Commission accepted the price-undertakings offered by some of the exporters. However, it is never revealed how many exporters are 
granted undertakings. 
(b) The average duty is the country wide duty that applies to “all other exporting producers”. Exporters that co-operate in the EU AD investigation often get a lower duty. 
(c) An expiry review case can be initiated at the earliest 3 months before the end of the 5 year AD protection period. Protection continues during the expiry review investigation. When 
the expiry review is affirmative, the AD protection is extended for another 5 year period. 
(d) This case consists of 3 cases belonging to the same sector: “Briefcases and Schoolbags”; “Luggage and Travel Goods”; “Leather Handbags”.
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Matched Control Group 
Mean 
Median 

















Affirmative AD Cases 
Mean 
Median 







Note: TFP refers to the exponential of log TFP obtained from estimating equation (2). When we set the 
mean level of TFP in the matched group equal to 100, we can express the means of the Termination 
group and the Affirmative group as a percentage. For example before filing the Termination cases are 
only about 65% as productive as the Matched group, while the Affirmative cases are on average only 
60% as productive compared to the Matched.   
Table 3: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of AD Protection on  
Firm Level TFP 
CONTROL  TERMINATIONS MATCHED 
 












PPI 4-digit PPI 4-digit PPI  
4-digit 
PPI 4-digit 












Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location X Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) Coefficient - - 0.44** 0.44** - 0.44** 
Overall R2 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.20 
# observations 40,686 38,768 36,253 39,171 69,303 61,102 
Notes: (i)  ***/** refer to respectively significance at the 1%/5% level, (ii) Heteroskedastic robust  
standard errors between brackets, (iii) The statistical significance of the AR(1) coefficient is based on 
the Baltagi-Wu (1999) test statistic, of which the critical value has to lie below 2, which is the case in 
all the specifications.    
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Table 4: Difference-in-difference Effects of AD protection on EU Prices of Protected 













AD-PRICE-EFFECT x year 2  - 0.067 
(0.050) 
AD-PRICE-EFFECTx year 3 - 0.043 
(0.052) 
AD-PRICE-EFFECT x year 4 - 0.103** 
(0.052) 
AD-PRICE-EFFECTx year 5 - 0.110** 
(0.053) 
AD-PRICE-EFFECT x year 6 - 0.019 
(0.057) 
AD-PRICE-EFFECT x year 7 - 0.058 
(0.074) 
AR(1) coefficient 0.46** 0.47** 
#observations 399 399 
Overall R2 0.04 0.04 
PRODUCT-FIXED EFFECT YES YES 
Notes: as in Table 3   
Table 5: Distance-to-the-Frontier and Single versus Multiple Product Firms  












































Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location X Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR (1) coefficient 0.43** 0.40** 0.40** 0.43** 0.40** 0.40** 
Overall R2 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.19 0.01 
# observations 35,445 20,734 4,409 59,668 35,908 5,928 
Notes:  as in Table 3 
We define Distance as the initial “distance-to-the-frontier” for each firm i as the ratio of Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) over the productivity in the frontier firm j in the initial year of our sample. This 
frontier firm is the firm with the highest TFP in the same NACE 4 digit industry.   
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Table 6: Robustness checks   
CONTROL  TERMINATIONS 
BERTRAND et al. (2004)  
correction 
TREFLER (2004) 




TFP level  
(2)  
TFP level  





















AD Effect after 1 year 
- - - - 0.042*** 
(0.008) 
AD Effect after 2 years 
- - - - 0.049*** 
(0.008) 
AD Effect after 3 years 
- - - - 0.041*** 
(0.009) 
AD Effect after 4 years 
- - - - 0.039*** 
(0.008) 
AD Effect after 5 years 
- - - - Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location X Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall R2 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.03 
# observations 5,445 5,445 5,445 5,445 40,686 
Notes:  As in Table 5.    
Table 7: Where do Productivity Improvements come from? Dif-in-Dif results  
CONTROL GROUP TERMINATIONS 
Dependent variable  ln(Empl) R&D- 
Sales  
Ratio 
(ln Wage) Gross  
Investment 




















AR (1) coefficient 0.61** 0.62** 0.44** 0.94** 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes Yes 
# observations 36,783 36,832 36,038 47,518 
Note: as in Table 3  
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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
initial TFP relative to frontier TFP
kdensity employment weighted kdensity unweighted
Kernel Density of initial distance in the protected cases 
Note: We define the initial “distance-to-the-frontier” for each firm i as the ratio of Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) over the productivity in the frontier firm j in the initial year of our sample. This 
frontier firm is the firm with the highest TFP in the same NACE 4 digit industry. On the horizontal 
axis, a distance close to 1 refers to a very efficient firm while the closer to 0, the more relatively 
inefficient the firms are.    
Figure 2: Initial Distance and Productivity Change during Protection for Single 
     Product Firms   















































Notes: Distance on the horizontal axis is defined as in Figure 1. The changes in productivity are based 
on the regression coefficients in column (2) and column (5) in Table 5 where the protected firms are 
compared to the Terminations and to the Matched firms respectively. 
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Note: Standard deviations are between brackets.  
Table A.2.: Multi-nominal Logit Estimation of the Probability of AD Protection   
and Termination    
Dependent variable:”1” if no filing;”2” if 
“Filing & Termination;”3” if “Filing & 
Protection 
Explanatory Variables (a) (b) 
Determinants of Terminations given Filing   
















Average labor productivity lagged - -1.199* 
(0.728) 
  
Determinants of Protection given Filing   
















Average labor productivity lagged - 0.197 
(0.65) 
Chi-squared statistic 92.70*** 102.04*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.25 0.26 
Number of observations 1,286 1,284 
Note: */**/*** denotes statistically significant at the 10%,5% and 1% level respectively 
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